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Case No. 18231
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KUTV, Inc., Deseret News Publishing Company,
KSL AM and TV, a Division of Bonneville
International Corporation, and Society of
Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter
Petitioners,
Honorable Dean E. Conder, District Judge
and Ronald Dale Easthope
Respondents.
COMPLAINT AND PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF KSL AM
AND TV AND SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS

Petitioners KSL AM and TV, a division of Bonneville
International Corporation and Society of Professional
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter, respectfully submit
this memorandum of points and authorities in support of their
petition.
The petitioners challenge the district court's gag order
which barred any media reference to Ronald Dale Easthope
(Easthope) as the "Sugar House rapist" or to his prior criminal
record during the pendency of Mr.

Easthope's trial in State of

Utah v. Ronald Dale Easthope, CRSl-1349.
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I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ENTERED A GAG ORDER PRECLUDING THE MEDIA
FROM REPORTING ELEVEN-YEAR-OLD FACTS.
Eleven years ago Easthope captured considerable media atten-

tion when he became known as the Sugar House rapist after the
state charged him with a series of related sexual assaults in the
Sugar House area of Salt Lake City.

In June, 1971, Easthope was

convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to prison.

Ten

years later, in September, 1981, while on parol from prison,
Easthope was charged with another rape.

KSL radio, the Salt Lake

Tribune, and the Deseret News all reported that Easthope, the man
convicted of rape in 1971 and known as the "Sugar House rapist",
faced new but similar charges.

Later, in October, 1981, the

Tribune reported the postponement of Easthope's preliminary
hearing, and again referred to him as the "Sugar House rapist."
(The radio broadcast transcript and newspaper articles are
appended as Exhibit A.)
On February 3, 1982, when Easthope's trial began, his counsel
asked the court to sequester the jury, arguing that sequestration
would prevent any possible prejudice from media coverage of the
trial.

(Partial Transcript designated as "Judge's Order", p.2,

appended as Exhibit B)

The court, apparently satisfied that

there was no danger of prejudice from publicity denied the motion
but expressly encouraged counsel to renew it if necessary.
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Near the close of the first day's testimony, defense counsel
recognized a reporter from KUTV in the courtroom.

The reporter

was invited to chambers where the following colloquy occurred:
The Court: Let me see counsel in chambers.
The record should show the proceedings are in
chambers in the absence of the jury. And did
you contact -the news director or whoever it
was? Okay. Does your station come to any
conclusion?
Mr. [Dick] Allgire:
back right now.

I am supposed to call them

The Court: Okay. I am going to do this,
because I think it would be highly prejudicial
to refer to him [Easthope] in any news report
as the "Sugarhouse rapist"; I am going to
issue an order that none of the news media is
to use the term "Sugarhouse rapist" during the
course of the trial, because I think it is
highly prejudicial.
Mr. Brown: Could that order go further to any
comment surrounding the proceeding of Mr.
Easthope ten or eleven years aryo; that's the
reason I made the motion to sequester the
jury, Your Honor, because I anticipated that.
The Court: I think that I will extend it to
any comments about Mr. Easthope's activities
prior to the trial that would in any way show
his involvement with the law.
Dick, I am not trying to cut the news
media out. I want a fair trial, I don't want
to have any statement made for publicity that
would be adverse to the defendant because he
is entitled to a free and fair trial.

*

* *

Mr. Allgire:
Can we wait? My attorney
should be calling any second. They wanted me
to talk to him before I say anything.
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The Court:
Sure. I'll talk to him if you
want. Tell him the same thing. You can talk
to him and you can use my phone if you want.
(Tr. pp 4-6, Exh. B)
When KUTV's counsel.arrived, the District Court repeated the
substance of its gag order and refused to vacate it.
counsel's request the District Court
the same terms as his oral order.
1982, appended as Exhibit C).

si~ned

At

a written order on

("Order," dated February 4,

This Court refused KUTV's

emergency motion to stay the criminal proceedings, and shortly
thereafter, on February 4, 1982, this petition was filed.

On

February 8, 1982, the juri found Easthope guilty of aggravated
sexual assault.*

*

Although the jury in the Easthope trial has returned a verdict, this controversy is not moot. Because the gag order in
a criminal trial is inherently limited by the duration of the
trial, it necessarily presents an issue capable of repetition
yet evading review. As such, the gag order here presents a
recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). As Justice
Stewart recently noted in Wickham v. Fisher:
The principles that determine the justiciabili ty of the instant case are the well-established
rules which permit a court to ~itigate an issue
which, although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the time of appeal, is of
wide concern, affects the public interest, is
likely to recur in a similar manner, and,
because of the brief time any one person is
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review. 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah, 1981).
The Petition now before this Court raises, for the second
time in seven months, issues concerning the safeguards
required by the First Amendment in cases or trials of public
interest and importance. See KUTV, Inc. v. Honorable Dean
E. Conder and John Preston Creer, Case No. 17822. The nature
of the issues involved as well as their demonstrated repetition compel consideration of the gag order's validity.
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II.

GAG ORDERS MAY BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.
Courts abhor prior restraints, such as gag orders, because they

constitute "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."
539, 559 (1976).

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

Unlike virtually any other judicial procedure,

prior restraints impose an "immediate and irreversible sanction."
Id.

Most importantly, however, prior restraints strike at the

very heart of the democratic principles which spawned First
Amendment guarantees.

As Justice Stewart stated in New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29
L.Ed.2d 822, 832-33 (1971),
[A] press that is alert, aware and free most
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First
Amendment. For without an informed and free
press there cannot be an enlightened people.
In light of these grave consequences, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "(a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."

Bantam Books v.

Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593, 83 S.Ct. 631
(1963).

See also, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

at 714; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419, 9-S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1, 6 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283

u.s.

697, 51 s.ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).

Thus, any attempt

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to impose a prior restraint "carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint."
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, 402 U.S. at
419; New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S. at 714.
So difficult is it to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality, that the narrow class of cases upholding prior
restraints involve only war or equally extreme circumstances.

New

York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S. at 726,
(Brennan, J.
III.

concurring.)

THIS GAG ORDER WAS UNNECESSARY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.

Before a Court May Impose A Prior Restraint, It Must
Observe Constitutionally Required Procedures To
Determine Whether The Restraint Is Unavoidable.

In order to overcome the heavy presumption against the imposition of a prior restraint, the Constitution requires a careful
and thorough procedure designed to establish a clear record
requiring the restraint.

As the Supreme Court stated in Carroll

v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 89

s.

Ct.

400, 29 L.Ed.2d 325, 331 (1968):
And even where this presumption [of unconstitionali ty] might otherwise be overcome, the
Court has insisted upon careful procedural
provisions, designed to assure the fullest
presentation and consideration of the matter
which the circumstances permit. As the Court
said in Freedman v. Maryland, [380 U.S. 58,
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13 L.Ed.2d at 654, a noncriminal process of
prior restraints upon expression "avoids
constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.
At a minimum, that procedure requira.s first that evidence be
adduced to establish that a clear and present danger would result
from the challenged publication.
In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger. Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510, 71 s. Ct.
857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951).
The landmark case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976), applied the standards of these earlier Supreme Court
prior restraint holdings specifically to gag orders.

The case

began with the murder of six members of a family in a small
Nebraska town, an act which immediately attracted widespread,
national news coverage.

The defendant quickly argued that the

extensive publicity jeopardized his fair trial rights, and
requested the trial court to issue a protective order banning
further coverage.

After an abreviated hearing, the Court found

"a clear and present danger that pre-trial publicity could
impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial."
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 543.

Nebraska

The Court then

issued an order prohibiting newspapers from publishing certain

-8-
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known facts such as the existence or contents or the accused's
confession and the contents of a note he had written the night of
the crime.

That broad protective order was upheld by the

Nebraska Supreme Court, but the United States Supreme Court found
it to be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's opinion diagramed the Constitutional
safeguards which all courts must follow before issuing a gag
order.

As a safeguard against judicial censorship, this rigorous

procedure requires a trial judge to record findings of fact on
each of the following:
"(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news
coverage;
(b) whether other measures would be likely to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial
publicity; and
(c) how effectively a restraining order would
operate to prevent the threatened danger."
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427
U.S. at 562.
After reviewing these procedures the Court held that the
Nebraska trial court erred in issuing its gag order because it
failed to make express findings that measures other than a gag
order would mitigate the effects of the pretrial publicity.
Specifically, the Court held that the trial court should have
considered and entered findings on the following alternatives:
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(a)

change of trial venue to a place less
exposed to the intense publicity;

(b)

postponement of the trial to allow public
attention to subside;

{c)

searching questioning of prospective _
jurors to screen out those with fixed
opinions as to guilt or innocence;

(d)

the use of emphatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to
decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court; and

(e)

sequestration of jurors. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-564.

After examining the record, the Supreme Court determined that
there was no evidence or finding that these alternative measures
would have been ineffective in protecting the defendant's right.
Conversely, there was no finding that the gag order would have
been effective.

The Court concluded that the defendant failed to

meet the "heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior
restraint."
B.

The District Court Failed To Follow The Procedure
Required By The Constitution Before A Court May
Limit The Media.
1.

The record shows no evidence that media
coverage created a clear and present danger.

The record in this case fails at the very first step.
Nebraska Press requires a finding that media coverage posed clear
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and present danger.

The record before the district court in

Nebraska Press suggested pervasive publicity, from the date of
the crime through the court's ruling.

By contrast, the record in

this case reflects no inquiry into the scope and nature of media
coverage.

Whatever pretrial publicity may have occurred, the

parties and the court were satisfied that media coverage had not
affected the jury panel.

(See, Exh. A)

P.2d 1338 1348-49 (Utah, 1977), cert.

Cf. State v. Pierre, 572

c~n.

439 U.S. 882.

Thus,

the District Court's only task was to assure the impartiality of
the sitting jury during the course of a short trial.

Apparently,

at one point before the reporter appeared in court the court
concluded that the threat of "anticipated" media coverage did not
present a danger to a fair trial, and denied the defendant's
motion to sequester the jury.
appended as Exhibit B)

(Partial Transcript, p. 2,

In these circumstances, it is remarkable

that the district court was so quick to enter its gag order upon
the appearance of only one reporter in the courtroom.
Apparently, the District Judge entered the Order based only on
his notion that any publicity would affect the trial:
"Okay, I am going to do this [enter the order]
because I think it would be highly prejudicial
to refer to him in any news re~ort as the
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"Sugarhouse rapist". • • • (Partial Trans.,
pp. 4-5 appended as Exhibit B).~/
As Justice Brennan stated in New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. at 725,
[t]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no
prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward
consequences may result.
Under Nebraska Press procedures, then, the district court's
failure to determine the nature and extent of the news coverage
precluded any sustainable finding of a clear and present danger.
Without that initial investigation and related finding, there can
be no legal prior restraint on the media.

~/

The district court's

Disregarding the Order's impairment of, the First
Amendment, the order suffers from enormous jurisdictional and due process defects. Like the trial court
order in Nebraska Press, the order here purports to
apply broadly to all members of the media, even though
the court has no jurisdiction over them. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 565-566 n.9.
Moreover, the order purports to restrain all members of
the media from exercising fundamental rights without
affording them the opportunity to be heard. Id. Both
of those defects invalidate the gag order in this case.
The inadequacy of this record is unquestionable. There
was no evidence or finding that could lead to the
conclusion that media coverage posed a clear and present
danger. There was nothing but the Court's conjecture.

-12-
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order failed at the very first step of the inquiry.

Although the

finding of a clear and present danger is the essential precondition to any valid restraint, it is only the beginning of the
examination.
2.

The trial court failed to evaluate less
restrictive alternative remedies.

If the record in this case had revealed solid evidence of a
clear and present danger, the Constitution would have required
the Court to exhaust all alternative remedies, no matter how
inconvenient, before it considered any abridgment of the First
Amendment.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,

100 S. Ct. 2814, 2829 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. at 569; Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth, 181
N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1970).
Even if the trial court had properly reviewed the facts and
found a clear and present danger, it could have avoided a constitutional conflict if it had merely considered alternatives to a
gag order.

But the· trial court issued this gag order without

even considering alternative remedies.

Given the speculative

basis for the inference of a danger in the first place, it is
likely that the court's objective of preserving a fair trial
could have been accomplished with moderate alternatives, such as
instructions to the jury to avoid newspaper and electronic news
during the trial and daily voir dire of jury members.

Even the·

inconvenience that sequestration might have caused the jury is
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inconsequential compared to the concern of preserving the First
Amendment.
[T]he inconvenience suffered by jurors who
are sequestered to prevent exposure to
excluded evidence which may be published in
the press is a small price to pay for the
public's right to timely knowledge of trial
proceedings guaranteed by free~om of the
press. . • •
'
State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. v. Mcintosh, 340 So.2d 904, 910
(Fla. 1977).
It seems certain that if the District Court had followed the
procedures described in Nebraska Press it would not have imposed
a gag order, if for no other reason than the order could not prevent the perceived danger.

The information barred by the order

had been released to the publi9 in official court records and had
been in the public official court records and had been in the
public not only ten years before, but just prior to trial.

The

information was openly available to the jury irrespective of the
court's order.

Thus, the Court's order could not insure that

Easthope's title and record would not

b~come

known to the jury.

In addition, as a matter of clear Constitutional law, that kind
of published, historical information is simply not subject to
prior restraint.

"[T]he press may not be prohibited from

'truthfully publishing information released to the public in
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official court records' Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S.
469 (1975) ."

Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court, 430 U.S.

308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 568.

c.

In This Case There was No Conflict Between The
First and Sixth Amendments.

The gag order may have been based on a sincere but unsupported belief that the reporting of Easthope's prior criminal
record would preclude his fair trial.

By issuing the gag order

to protect fair trial rights, however, the District Court
apparently constructed a false conflict between the First and
Sixth Amendments and gave the Sixth Amendment preference.
The Bill of Rights assigns no priorities between the rights
of the First and Sixth Amendments.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has

held that neither necessarily takes ascendancy over the other and
that the courts are required to preserve both.

Nebraska Press

Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 566, 562. The gag order in
this case violates that basic Constitutional principle by giving
absolute ascendency to the Sixth Amendment.

Moreover, the

District Court took that unprecedented legal posture without any
basis in the record for the slightest, let alone the most
stringent, of First Amendment proscriptions.

Prior restraint of

the pr.ess was plainly not justified in this case.
Other state courts in following the required constitutional
and procedural safeguards, have refused to issue gag orders in
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cases virtually identical to this one.
v. Lofton, 598 S.W.2d 745 (Ark.

In Arkansas Gazette Co.

1980), the defendant had been

convicted of two rapes committed in the Quapaw Quarter of Little
Rock.

Prior to trial for another rape the trial court issued a

gag order restraining the Gazette from referring to the defendant
as the "Quapaw Quarter rapist" in any pre-trial stories.

The

Gazette took a writ to the Arkansas Supreme Court which found the
order unconstitutional.

In reaching that decision the court

recognized that the gag order constituted constitutionally impermissible judicial censorship of the news media:
We are cited no case nor does our research
reveal one which permits judicial censorship
of the use of descriptive words by the news
media. In effect, here the press was merely
paraphrasing what the public records reveal.
use of the phrase by the petitioner is protected by the federal First Amendment and Art.
2, §6, of our own consitution. The restraint
of these constitutional rights amounts to a
judicial censorship which is beyond the jurisdiction of this or any court. Therefore, the
restraint imposed by the court cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny.
598 S.W.2d at 746-747.

(emphasis added).

See also, Randolph v.

NBC, 7 Med. L. Rep. 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's gag order

should be vacated.
NEBEKER

Attorneys for KSL
nd TV,
a Division of Bonneville
International Corporation,
and Society of Professional
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi,
Utah Chapter
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF KSL AM AND TV AND
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLAINT
AND PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF was mailed, postage
prepaid this 13th day of May, 1982 to:
Honorable Dean E. Conder
District Judge
Third Judicial District Court
Metropolitan Hall of Justice
Salt Lake City~ Utah 84111
Thomas P.
SALT LAKE
431 South
Salt Lake

Vuyk,
COUNT
Third
City,

Esq
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
East
Utah 84111

George M. McMillan, Esq.
Patrick A. Shea, Esq.
Kate Lahey, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Lynn R. Brown, Esq.
LEGAL DEFENDERS OFFICE
333 South Second East #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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K-48

:

I~

thorum: sugarhouse rapist violates parole
4pm

rmic
EXHIBIT "A" - Page 1

KSL Radio

~ l N 1971 Tr£ MAi K,·~tJHfi J.S THE SUGAPJ-i:JJSE RAP IST WAS CQ\N ICTEO OF

RAPE Ai'iD SE~.ff TO PRIS°'i.
PMQED.

(}l

JJLY 14TH THIS YEM, RO.·~:t.. EASTHtJ>E WAS

S.ALT LAKE Cl TY W p·)LICE SGT. LARHY THaui SAYS EASTHJ:>E WAS

ARRESTED TH I S WEEK8·;0 O.~ XMm SJSP l Cl \Jl~ lF RAPE QiARGES.

:19

••• that rape ••••••

"arrested a male whi.te for a rape that occurred in the area of eleventh
east and rlownington on the ~orning of Saturday the ninteenth. He was
arrested Sunday morning in the downtown area and charged with that rape."
TH®IH SAYS I 1.J'Olt\ATl
.ARREST.

•1~

FRJ1

A;~ Uri-1U-.'1ED

TEN YEARS AGO EASTHJPE

auorn

5;lJRCE LEAD TD EASTHOPE 'S

p 1.1 CE FOR SEVER.al H{);1lHS BEFORE

~XX tE WftS f 1.tPLLY ARRESTED A1~ C~NI CTEO. ·
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EXHIBIT "A" - Page 2

Deseret News

. !"·-..•.

· ·:s~.7:._:~

~;~·]"':-;..::·,:: ..· . .

·- ·------.~~-

·,Rapist cParged agair;. . · ·
_ .

·f· '.,,

•.....

·~··

·> ..

·<fa

StP 2 4 198r<

A· man who was termed the .-.Sugar House - ~·. - . ·
.'rapist," out of prison tM11>..#A. monilis. has been :. ·. • :\
J~~arged with icxua~.a1i!t of 17-year-old girl. .: : ~-. :..
:!-:. · · R~ld~ ~e. 35, 1~5
W. 2280 South. was .. '··.·-: .
.·!·charg
ggravated se
~ult, :i first- .. ·~--~.·~~-·
.:j degre elo , · in an · inform ·
signed by Sgt. ·: ~ > :~ ·:
~j R.ich . Thorum. zt ·
Lake . ty ~olicc, befor~ 5th ; ~: ::1Circw Judge ~tef'1
Morns.
· · · ··
· ·. '-. ·

. a

r;~-~E~s~~~pe~~t ~~~~~~~ape~~fc~f:n1~1r~~-::{~~~I

wiili it ll\D)t'\e7'counts of rapc.J.O
lY and burglary ~;: :-:·in. connEW"on with incid~nt· ~ ugar House area
··1
during 1970 andfil.
rvcd nine years. in ili.e .:. ~; ·, · ·'
Utah ~tate Priso . Q.J
·" . ·. ·-~.,~
· ·
In the m~
nt incident, a9\::irl awoke early -~ : ·· ' Saturday mo ·ug to find a man with a pillow_ case '::t~~::.
\ over his hea
ith eye holes cut in it. J,11e man ...·i;~e".:_
r threatened-her with a.large ltjtchen knife.and.ilien ~~-~'~"
raped her · ·'.·:• · •.. ·· ·· ·.-' '"::- .,... - -. -: · .. · ..... : .. =· ·_:! '' ... ~·:

<.. ·. ·
:< ;

>:

The t;pical method of the Suga~ House rapist in . -;
-~~=
1970, was to approach sleeping victims after · ~· ,:
breaking into their apartments and rape them after:7 ; . ·.
threatening iliem with a gun. '. · ,... :
·~ :::· ·· · ·
·
: .: · Easthopc was arrested in a Salt Lake hotel/:·.;~ ·'-·
. coffee shop later Saturday. morning.
: '. · · .7 .• · ' -~~ ·~
He is currently on parole from the Utah State ·.
Prison. and has been booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail. He is bc_ing held without bail.
·

r.
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Salt Lake Tribune

~.

EXHIBIT "A" - Page 3
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EXHIBIT "B"

2
3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH
IW.AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
The STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff.

4

*

5
6

-vs-

*

7

8

JUDGE'S

ORDER

*

RONALD D. EASTHOPE,

9

Case No. CR. ·81.::. 1349

Defendant.

*

10

*

11

12

*

13

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the Third day of February, 1982

H

above-entitl~d

15

the

l(i

before the Hon. Dean E. Conder, one of the Judges of the above

Ii

named Court and at the hour of ten o'clock a.m.

18

cause of action came on regularly for heati_g

APPEARANCES

19
20

Ernie Jones
Deputy Ct. Attorney
431 S. Third East
City

For the State:

Ml:.

For the Defendant:

Mr.

21

23

Lynn· Brown
Legal Defenders
333 S. Second East
City

24
25

2G
27

28
29
30

HAI.. M. WAL.TON. C.S.R.

__J
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IN CHAMBERS :
2
3

In the matter of the State of Utah versus

The court:

4

Ronald Dale Easthope.

5

you sir?

6

Mr. Easthope:

7

The court:

You're Mr. Ronald Dale Easthope, are

Yes, sir.
You're here represented by counsel.

These

proceedings are in chambers in the absence of the Jury.
Mr. Brown,
10

I understand you have a couple of moticns.

Mr. Brown:

Someti.lt'\e ago we filed two motions Your Honer.

11

Filed a motion to sequester the jury and filed a motion to

12

suppress or limit the statements of witnesses concerning any

13

testimony regarding the fact that Mr. Easthope has been

14

previously convicted of anything and previously incarcerated.

15

First, dealing with the question of the motion to

1Ci

17

sequester the jury.
Mr. Easthope in the past, has had some publicity,

18

approximately ten

rn

publicity;arid probably the Court remembers or is aware of some

20

of the publicity he had at the time.

21

or~eieven

years ago;considerable ammount of

At the time this case was filed and

shortl~:~efore

the

22

preliminary hearing, at least one news channel--Channel Two

23

called me up and wanted to do interviews with Mr. Easthope anc

2-1:

:bntended on covering the preliminary hearing. And I anticipated

25

that there would be a considerable ammount of news coverage

26

involving the trial of Mr. Easthope.

27

For that reason I made a motion to sequester the jury to

28

prevent any possibility that any members of the jury panel

29

could read any news reports, hear any television coverage or

30

talk with anybody that may know something about the case, or rave
HAI. M. WAI.TON,

e.s.R.
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2

read any publicity or heard any television reports.
2

3

4
5

It might be premature at this point.

In looking arourld

th~

Courtroom, I don1t know that there is any press or television
people out there at this time.

If the Court woulil take that

under advisement and we could observe what press or

televisio~

6

coverage that we get throughout this trial.
7
Perh~ps

the Court could rule on that motion this evening

when we recess for the day.
9

that there is

po~entially

But that concerns me, ·the fact

a good deal of--

10

The Court:
11

Was there much publicity in connection with

the preliminary hearing?

12

.Mr. Brown:

No, there

The court:

I didn't see any.

Mr. Brown:

No television coverage at all at the

wasn~t

.

13
14

15

preliminary hearing, and I never sought any news coverage.
Hi

The Court:

I am going to deny the motim at this time,

17

but leave the door open for further renewal of the motion
18

rn

should you see if there is some problem.
Mr. Brown:

With regard to the second motion

concernin<~

20

the testimony of witnesses.

I already talked to Mr. Jones

21

about that and he indicated that he would instruct his witnesses22

correct me if I am

wrong--nat to mention anything about the

23

fact that Mr. Easthape

is in prison, 9r not to mention anyth~ng

24

about the fact that he has been previously convicted

of

anyt~ing

25

I am particularly concerned about the testimony of Mr.
26

Hanks, where he stated at the preliminary hearing that Mr.
27

Easthope made a statement to him to th~ effect that" I did it

28

again;• which implies that he had done something similar to
29

that in the past.

If that could be regulated or---

30

HAl.. M. WAl..TON, c.s.R.

3
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The court:

I don't think there is any question but wha.

2

there should be no reference to prior offenses, if any.

3

I nave been advised that this is commonly known as the

4

And

" Sugarhouse rapist".

5

I am going to ask both counsel to admonish all witnesses
that they make no reference to any prior rapes or convictions

7

of any kind.

To try this case strictly on the facts of this

particular case.
Mr. Brown:
10

11
12

13
H

questioning to the victim at the preliminary hearing, quite
frequently referred to the Sugarhouse area.

Like to get away

from that too;that might bring back some memories among the
jury panel about all these rapes that took,'.p).ace in the
Sugarhouse area.

15
lG

we are concerned about Mr. Jones in his

The court:

I think Mr. Jones that you can refer to it

in a more specific--

17

Mr. Jones:

Ten ten Downing.ton Avenue.

18

The court:

--Without referreing to the Sugarhouse.

19

Ten ten Downington Avenue there is no association

with it.

20

Mr. Brown:

Downington Avenue is okay.

That's east and

21

west.
22

(Whereupon the trial proceeded to the conclusion of the
23

victims testimony.)
24

The Court:

Let me see counsel in chambers.

25

The

recor;~

should show the proceedings are in chambers in the absence of
26

the jury.

And did you contact the news director or whoever

i~

27

was?

Okay.

Does your station come to any conclusion ?

28

Mr. lllgire:

I am supposed to call them back right now.

29

The Court:
30

Okay.

I am g6ing to do this, because I

think it would be highly prejudiciallto refer~to him in any
HAI.. M. WAI.TOH, C:.S.R,

4
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news report as the

"Sugarhouse rapist";I am going to
terr~

2

issue an order that none of the news media is to use the

3

" Sugarhouse rapist" during the course of the trial, because

4

I think. iT is highly prejudicial.

5

Mr. Brown:

Could that order go further to any comment

surrounding the proceeding of Mr. Easthope ten or eleven yeaJs
7

ago;that's the reason I made the motion to sequester the

8

Your Honor, because I anticipated that.

9

The Court:

jur~,

I think. that I'wilLextend it to any commerts

IO

about Mr. Easthopes activities prior to the trial that would

11

in any way show his involvement with the law.

12

Dick,

I am not

trying to cut the news media out.

~

want a fair trial,

14

for publicity that would be adverse to the defendant because

15

I don~t

I

want to have any sta~ement made

_ _J

he is entitled to a free and fair trial.

Hi

Mr. Allgire:

May I use your phone?

17

The Court:

You can call whomever you wish right now

18

Mr. Allgire:

(Speaking into phone:)

We are in chambers

1!)

and the Judge has ordered that we make no comment about

20

Easthope's prior activities or involvment with the law.

21
22

we would lik.e to have our attorney call.
The Court:

Call that number and the baillif will put

23

you through.

24

an order.

25

news media, as you see them, that this is going to be my ordEr.

26

I don't want to have any adverse publicity.

I think for a fair trial I am going to make thct

Do you know how to get the news to the rest of thE~

27

Mr. Allgire:

28

carter of the Tribune.

29

the trial.

30

The Court:

Well, if they aren't here, I'll tell MikE
Don't know if anyone else is aware o

I don't know how else unless I call the
HAI.. M. WAI.TON, c.s.R.
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5 .

Okay we'll go·back in.9RHf~·

news media.
2

3
4

5
6

can we wait?

Mr. Allgire:

any second.

They wanted

'.ll.he court:

Sure.

me

My attorney shou~d be callincr

to talk to him before I say anyth ng.

I'll talk to him if you want.

Tell

h~l

You can talk to him and you can use my

the same thing.

phone if you want.

7

C E R T I F I CA T E

8

9

10
11

12
13

14

15
Hi

17

Salt Lake county)
ss.

State of Utah

I, Hal M. Walton do hereby certify that I am
a certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on
the Third day of February,· 1982 I took down the preceding
hearing in chambers and transcribed it into the preceding
five pages and is a

true

record~ UJJ£'

18

H.M .--wai

to~ c. s::~· Cl'.

20

21

22
23

24
25
26

27

28
29
30

HAL. M. WAL.TON, c.s.R.
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EXHIBIT

11

C 11

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
,STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vsRONALD DALE EASTHOPE,
Defendant.

ORDER
CR 81-1349

During the proceedings in the above-entitled matter, I
requested a reporter from KUTV, Inc. to come to my chambers
with the Prosecutor, the Defendant, and counsel for the Defendant.
In chambers I indicated the Court's concern for the Defendant's
rights to a fair trial if certain terms or past criminal records
were mentioned by the news media.

Accordingly,

· IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The news media in and for Salt Lake County and the State
of Utah are prohibited from broadcasting, publishing or otherwise conveying to the public any of the following:
1)

The words "Sugarhouse rapist",

2)

Any information relating to the past convictions of

defendant Ronald Dale Easthope,
during the pendency of the above-entitled matter

b~fore

this

Court.
DATED this 4th day of February, 1982.
BY THE COURT:

. -."- ·-~~v:-~':'kt-t
·,

t:·

y( /

Dean E. Conder, District Judge

··~;~

S".<r.J~Lc~ -~.,.,.._,,,4 ~ <J

_;{,,), .:vC

(

l'-LP~!-.....f ~

VAN COTT. BAGL.EY. CORNWAL.L. !It MCCARTHY
A

~111torCSSIONA\..

C:OAP'OlllATION

SUITt 1100, SO SOUTH MAIM STllll:CCT

SAl.T I.AKE C:ITY, UTAH B•t••
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